ABSTRACT Vehicle platooning, which is formed by a group of vehicles traveling in close proximity to one another, nose-to-tail, at highway speeds, has received considerable attention in recent years. However, though it brings many opportunities in self-driving, the security of vehicle platooning is still challenging. In this paper, to secure vehicle platooning, particularly to secure communication and efficient key updating for vehicles in a platoon, we first present the notion of ternary join exit tree. A ternary join exit tree consists of main tree, join tree, and exit tree. The users join in the join tree and leave from exit tree. Then, we propose a new dynamic ternary join-exit tree-based dynamic key management scheme, called TJET, for vehicle platooning, which is characterized by providing efficient key updating for not only vehicle joining and leaving, but also platoon merging and splitting. Specifically, based on the structure of ternary join-exit tree, we devise concrete algorithms for vehicle joining, vehicle exiting, platoon merging, and splitting. Moreover, we also analyze the capacities and activation conditions of join tree and exit tree based on strict mathematical proofs. Detailed security analysis show that our proposed TJET holds desirable security properties including forward security, backward security, and resistance to key control. In addition, performance evaluations via extensive simulations demonstrate the efficiency of TJET.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the world's population grows, the number of vehicles on the road is continuously increasing by a wide margin, and it has been estimated that there exist more than 1 billion vehicles worldwide. Accordingly, some critical issues such as fuel waste, air pollution, and traffic congestion have become even more serious. In order to solve these issues, platoon-based driving pattern is proposed. A vehicle platoon (also known as road train) [1] - [3] is a collection of vehicles which consists of a leader vehicle and member vehicles. The leader vehicle is driven manually, and each member vehicle follows the leader automatically according to the instructions from the leader vehicle. In addition, to avoid interference from other vehicles, each member vehicle keeps a small gap to the vehicle in front. Vehicle platooning can not only help achieve fuel saving and reduction of air pollution by reducing the aerodynamic drag in a platoon, but also decrease traffic congestion by increasing roadway capacity, since the distance between two member vehicles is maintained at a small size. The experiments in PATH project [4] showed that if the vehicles were driven in ten-car platoon, the car lane capacity can be increased by a factor of two to three. Besides the above mentioned, vehicle platooning has numerous other expected advantages. For instance, platoon-based driving can help increase driver convenience and comfort. The drivers of member vehicles in a platoon can even read books, see movies and make phone calls and others.
However, designing a platoon-based vehicular cyberphysical system still face many security challenges. For instance, if a maliciously controlled vehicle joins a platoon, it can cause the platoon to oscillate at a resonant frequency which can result in serious injury. Additionally, how to design detailed platooning operations to achieve vehicle entry and vehicle leaving and what related information should be sent inside the platoon should also be considered. For these reasons, some solutions have been presented to solve these challenges [5] - [7] . Nevertheless, another critical issue about platooning has not been well concerned, i.e., secure communication and efficient key update for vehicle platoon. Specifically, in order to achieve secure communication, group keys should be established and updated efficiently when vehicles join or leave, vehicles are moving at high speeds.
Aiming at the above challenge, in this paper, we propose a new ternary join-exit-tree (TJET) based key management scheme for vehicle platooning. Specifically, the main contributions of this paper are three-fold.
• We propose the notion of ternary join exit tree, and exploit 3-party Diffie-Hellman [8] and 2-party DiffieHellman protocols [9] to compute the group key. We present concrete group key updating algorithms to achieve secure communication inside the platoon.
• The proposed TJET scheme can efficiently achieve group key updating for dynamic platoon. In TJET, the computation complexity and communication round can be reduced to O(log 3 log 3 (n)) by utilizing ternary join exit tree where n is the number of group members. Though some other ternary tree based key management schemes were proposed [10] , [11] , join tree and exit tree are not utilized in these schemes. If join tree and exit tree are used, there are at least two issues which should be considered-how to compute the activation conditions and capacities of ternary join tree and exit tree. In TJET scheme, we give the concrete analysis of the activation conditions and capacities based on strict mathematical proofs. In TJET scheme, as soon as the number of vehicles n exceeds 5, the computation complexity and communication round of group key updating for vehicle join is reduced to O(log 3 log 3 (n)). In addition, if n > 38 holds, the computation complexity and communication round of group key updating for vehicle exit is also reduced to O(log 3 log 3 (n)). Though Mao et al. [12] proposed a binary join-exit-tree based key management scheme (JET). In contrast, in JET, if the group contains fewer than 256 users, the computation complexity and communication round of group key updating for user exit will be O(log 2 (n)).
• To validate the efficiency of key updating for vehicle join and leaving, we also develop a custom simulator built in Java. We compare the efficiency of JET and the proposed TJET with different parameters. Simulation results show that the proposed TJET scheme can efficiently achieve the group key updating comparing with JET scheme. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formalize the system model, security model and identify the design goal. In Section III, we recall bilinear pairing, related complexity assumptions, the two-party and three-party key agreement as preliminaries. The proposed TJET scheme is introduced in Section IV, followed by the security analysis in Section V and the performance evaluation in Section VI. We give the related work in Section VII, and conclude this work in Section VIII.
II. MODELS AND DESIGN GOAL
In this section, we formulate the system model, the security model and identify the design goal.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
Our focus is on how to present a secret group session key to achieve the secure communication for a platoon. Particularly, the key should be efficiently updated when the size of the platoon dynamically changes, as shown in Fig 1. The system consists of four kinds of entities: platoons, platoon leaders, followers, and individual vehicles.
• Platoon: a platoon is a group of close-following vehicles, which includes a platoon leader and followers. We assume that the length of a platoon is no more that 300 metres.
• Platoon leader: also known as head vehicle which controls the whole platoon. When the session key of the platoon needs to be updated, the platoon leader will broadcast instructions to the followers.
• Followers: also known as member vehicles which follow the leader automatically. Followers get instructions from the leader and send requests to the leader both by Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications. If a follower approaches its destination, it will request to the leader and apply to leave the platoon.
• Individual vehicles: Individual vehicles do not belong to any platoon and could apply to join platoons. When an individual vehicle V wants to join a platoon, V has to get the leader's permit.
• TA: A Trusted Authority (TA) generates a private key and a public key for each vehicle. A revocation certificate list (RCL) is maintained by TA. If a vehicle is corrupted, its public key will be added in to RCL. There are two basic platoon maneuvers: merge and split. In merge, two platoons traveling on the same lane merge into one big platoon. In split, one platoon separates to form two smaller platoons. When platoon A and platoon B are 26974 VOLUME 5, 2017 driving to the same destination, they can choose to merge into one platoon C. If A wants to drive to another position, platoon C will separate. Accordingly, the platoon session key needs to be updated when aforementioned vehicle joining, follower exiting, platoon merging or platoon splitting event takes place. In a platoon, if the leader is unavailable, another vehicle (e.g.the vehicle behind the leader) in the platoon will be chosen as the new leader. For platoons, the leadership renewal is usually achieved by platoon management protocols, e.g. the scheme presented in [5] . Therefore, the details about how to capture leadership renewal are not discussed in details.
Generally speaking, vehicles can estimate when they will leave the group. The leader maintains a list according to when the vehicles leave. The list is also held by the vehicle members. If a vehicle joins or leaves, the leader will inform the members. Each vehicle in the platoon can improve the tree status according to TJET algorithms since all the algorithms and activation conditions are public. In addition, we assume the vehicles join/leave one by one.
B. SECURITY MODEL
To achieve secure communication inside a platoon, a group key for the platoon needs to be established. On one hand, the interference factors from the vehicles outside the platoon could be excluded. On the other hand, real-time information in the platoon can only be gained by current member vehicles. In our security model, outside attackers are considered. Similar to most previous key management schemes, the secure key management scheme for platoons is expected to hold the following secure properties.
• Authentication. Authentication guarantees the origin of data. Thus, attackers cannot impersonate the legitimate vehicles to execute the scheme.
• Integrity. Data Integrity ensures that data sent by vehicles has not been altered by attackers.
• Forward Secrecy: After a vehicle member leaves a platoon, it cannot compute any subsequent platoon group key. This property guarantees that as soon as a vehicle exits, it cannot communicate with the platoon any longer.
• Backward Secrecy: After a vehicle member joins a platoon, it cannot compute any previous platoon group key. This property can guarantee that the new member cannot get earlier information inside the platoon.
• Resistance to key control: Resistance to key control should be achieved to ensure any vehicle in a platoon is unable to choose or influence the value of the platoon group key. If a key management scheme holds resistance to key control [13] , no participant can control the key. Specifically, the group session key is sufficiently random if at least one of participants is able to generate sufficiently random inputs. In addition, the participants can be sure that the session key is new by ensuring that their own input is new. That is, no user can force use of an old key.
Under the aforementioned system model, our design goal is to construct an efficient and secure dynamic key management scheme for a platoon. Particularly, the following two objectives should be captured.
• Security. The proposed scheme should exhibit authentication, integrity, forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Thus, any member vehicle who leaves cannot learn any new group keys, and new group members will not be able to learn old keys as well. Besides, the scheme should resist key control to guarantee that no vehicle can control the key of platoon.
• Efficiency. As we have discussed early, a platoon key management scheme has stringent performance requirements. Specifically, the amount of time needed to recompute a new group key reflects the latency in vehicle join and exit. A good solution should achieve low time cost associated with key updates. In VANET, how to find out inside attackers is a challenging topic. In order to identify inside attackers, some solutions have been proposed e.g., the schemes presented in [14] - [16] . In addition, packet loss brings in influences and limitation of the communications. Accordingly, how to improve the VANET performance has been addressed [17] , [18] . In this paper, we mainly focus on constructing a dynamic key agreement for platoons to more efficiently establish and update shared group keys when vehicles join/leave. Therefore, inside attackers and packet loss are not considered.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will introduce bilinear pairing, related complexity assumptions, and two-party key agreement and three-party agreement techniques, which will serve as a basis of our scheme.
A. BILINEAR PAIRING AND COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
Let G and G T be two multiplicative groups of order p for some large prime p, and g be a generator of G. A bilinear map e : G × G → G T , which satisfies the following properties:
• Computability:ê(x, y) can be computed efficiently. Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption: Given (g, g a , g b ), there exists no probabilistic, polynomial time algorithm to compute g ab with non-negligible probability of success.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)assumption [19] : Given (g, g a , g b , g c ), there exists no probabilistic, polynomial time algorithm to computeê(g, g) abc with non-negligible probability of success.
Hash Diffie-Hellman (HDH) assumption [20] : given g a , g b , H (g ab ) and T , there exists no probabilistic, polynomial time algorithm to distinguish H (g ab ) and T with nonnegligible probability of success, where H čž{0, 1} * → S is a cryptographic hash function, and T is a random choice from S. VOLUME 5, 2017 Decision Hash Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DHBDH) assumption [21] : Given g, g a , g b , g c , H (ê(g, g) abc and T , there exists no probabilistic, polynomial time algorithm to distinguish H (ê(g, g) abc ) and T with non-negligible probability of success, where H čž{0, 1} * → S is a cryptographic hash function, and T is a random choice from S.
B. TWO-PARTY AND THREE-PARTY KEY AGREEMENT
Two participants establish a common session key by executing a 2-party Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol [9] . A calculates g a and B calculates g b and they exchange these values. After that, they compute the shared secret K AB = H (g ab ) (as shown in Fig. 2 (a) ), where H is a cryptographic hash function and H : {0, 1} * → Z * p . Three participants will compute a shared session key by executing a 3-party DH key agreement protocol [8] . A, B and C compute g a , g b , and g c respectively . After they exchange these values, they can compute shared secret
=ê(g, g) abc ) (as shown in Fig. 2(b) ). 
C. TIME EFFICIENCY ISSUE IN KEY MANAGEMENT
Similar to [12] , in this paper, we exploit ''simple round'' to evaluate the efficiency of key agreement. The notation of ''simple round'' is proposed in [22] , where each participant can send and receive at most one message in each round. In each round, each participant performs at most a two-party DH operation or a pair operation. The following definitions in [12] are also used in this paper.
• Average Join Time T J : The number of rounds to process key updates for a vehicle join event.
where R J is the total number of rounds executed for N J join events.
• Average Departure Time T E : The number of rounds for a vehicle exit event.
where R E is the total number of rounds performed for N E exit events.
• Overall Average Processing Time T is defined as T = R N , where N = N J + N E and R = R J + R E .
D. NOTATIONS FOR TJET
We list the notations used in the following sections in Table 1 as follows:
IV. PROPOSED TJET SCHEME FOR VEHICLE PLATOONING
In this section, we first present the ternary join exit tree; introduce the ternary join tree algorithm and ternary exit tree algorithm.
After that, we will analyze the capacities of join tree and exit tree, and their activation conditions. Finally, we will describe the detailed key establishment procedure for dynamic platoons.
A. TERNARY KEY TREE IN TJET
There are three types of nodes in a ternary key tree: leaf node, intermediate node, and root node.
• Leaf node: correspond with the private key of each group member. We also use a leaf node to denote a vehicle.
• Intermediate node: denote one key which is shared by all members of the subtree rooted at the intermediate node.
• Root node: represent the key shared by the whole group. Assume that there are n vehicles. A ternary key tree is constructed from bottom to top. The vehicles are first divided into triples. Then, each triple executes a 3-party DH operation and forms a subgroup. After that, the subgroups are divided into triples again (as shown in Fig. 3 (a) ). Continuing in this vein, the group key is established. If some subgroup consists of 2 vehicles (as shown in Fig. 3 (b) ), the 2 vehicles will execute 2-party DH operation. If only one vehicle is contained in some subgroup (Fig. 3 (c) ), no DH-operation is performed inside the subgroup. Take Fig. 3 (a) as an example, we will show how to compute the group key in detail. In order to make TJET scheme achieve authentication and integrity, a vehicle will send a message m together with the signature of m. For instances, a vehicle U 1 sends g a 1 along with sig U 1 (g a 1 ) . In order to simply the description of TJET, sig U 1 (g a 1 ) is omitted below.
Round 1: Each set of three vehicles forms a subgroup, i.e., , g) a 1 a 2 a 3 ) ). Similarly, U 4 , U 5 , and U 6 compute K 2 = H (e(g, g) a 4 a 5 a 6 )), U 7 , U 8 , and U 9 compute K 3 = H (e(g, g) a 7 a 8 a 9 )).
Round 2: Three subgroups (node) G 1 , G 2 and G 3 compute the new group key. Assume the leftmost member of a subgroup can be considered as a sponsor of the group, i.e., U 1 , U 4 , and U 7 are the sponsors of G 1 , G 2 and G 3 respectively. U 1 broadcasts g H (e(g,g) a 1 a 2 a 3 )) mod p to all the vehicles in G 2 and G 3 , U 4 broadcasts g H (e(g,g) a 4 a 5 a 6 )) mod p to all the vehicles in G 1 and G 3 , and U 7 broadcasts g H (e(g,g) a 7 a 8 a 9 )) mod p to all the vehicles in G 1 and G 2 . Then all the vehicles in G 1 , G 2 and G 3 compute the common group key
Key Updating: After a ternary key tree is built, if a vehicle U leaves or joins the group, the keys on the path from U to the root node will be updated. In Fig. 3 (c) , if U 1 leaves, both the keys on node 2 and node 1 require to be updated. If a vehicle joins the group, take Fig. 3 (d) as an example, the vehicle node 12 and new inner node 11 are added, both the keys on node 11 and node 1 need to be recomputed. Let the time efficiency be measured by number of rounds required to execute the (2 or 3-party) DH protocol. As the number of vehicles increases, the height of the key tree is expanded. As a result, more rounds are needed to update the subgroup keys when users joining/leaving. 
B. STRUCTURE OF TERNARY JOIN EXIT KEY TREE
According to Fig.3 , for a vehicle exit/join event, fewer rounds are required to update the group key if the height of a tree is smaller than that of other trees. Therefore, we construct ternary join exit key tree by exploring join tree and exit tree which are much smaller than the M-tree to reduce the computation and communication costs.
We define that a ternary join exit key tree consists of three parts: the join tree (J-tree), the exit tree (E-tree), and the main tree (M-tree). The topology of a ternary join exit key tree is showed as Fig. 4 (c) .
The capacities of J-tree and E-tree vary with the number of vehicles in M-tree. For instance, if there are only a few vehicles in M-tree, the J-tree and E-tree are inactivated (as shown in Fig. 4 (a) ), or only E-tree is set empty (as shown in Fig. 4 (b) ).
C. OVERVIEW OF VEHICLE JOINING/LEAVING GROUPS 1) VEHICLE JOINING THE GROUP
If J-tree is inactivated, the joining vehicles will be inserted into the M-tree. Otherwise, the following steps will be executed: • The joining vehicle will be inserted into the J-tree.
• If J-tree is full, all the vehicles in J-tree will be moved in batch into M-tree.
2) VEHICLE LEAVING THE GROUP
If E-tree is inactivated, the vehicles will leave from the M-tree. Otherwise, the following steps will be executed:
• The vehicles which are most likely to leave in a short time will be first relocated together into the E-tree,
• The vehicles will leave from E-tree. Join latency. We consider the waiting time for the joining vehicles as join latency. Join latency does not include the time spent for the vehicle movement from J-tree to the M-tree, since as soon as a vehicle joins the J-tree, it can communicate with other members. Therefore, join latency is the amount of time spent in computing a new group key when a vehicle joins the J-tree.
Exit latency. Exit latency does not include the time spent for the relocation from M-tree to E-tree. Exit latency is the number of rounds required to update the group key when a vehicle leaves the E-tree.
D. TERNARY J-TREE ALGORITHM
Ternary J-tree algorithm includes two parts: vehicle joining group and J-tree parameters analysis. Vehicle joining group consists of two procedures: the vehicle insertion into the J-tree, and node relocation from J-tree to M-tree. The J-tree parameters analysis includes J-tree capacity and J-tree activation condition analysis.
1) USER JOINING GROUP
Assume that a vehicle U wants to join the group. Then, vehicle U joining group includes two procedures: vehicle insertion into J-tree and nodes batch movement form J-tree to M-tree.
a: VEHICLE INSERTION INTO J-TREE
In order to insert the joining vehicle, an insertion node should be chosen in J-tree.
Insertion node. The insertion node is only used to find the position of the new node. After the vehicle U is added in the J-tree, the insertion node will be the parent node or sibling node of U .
The detailed insertion procedure is showed as follows:
• If J-tree is empty, the root node of M-tree is chosen as the insertion node and the insertion node is set as sibling node of the new node. U is added as the root node of the J-tree (as shown in Fig.5 (a)) . Additionally, U executes a 2-party DH operation with the insertion node to compute the group key.
• If J-tree is not empty, Algorithm 1 will be executed to choose the insertion node. Accordingly, the notations in Algorithm 1 are listed in Table 1 .
-If the insertion node has no child node or has three child nodes, it becomes the sibling node of U . U will perform a 2-party DH operation with the insertion node (as shown in Fig -If the insertion node has two child nodes, the insertion node becomes the parent node of U . Accordingly, U will execute a 3-party DH operation with insertion node's two child nodes (as shown in Fig. 5 (c) ). After that, the keys on the path from the insertion node to the root node of the whole key tree are recomputed. Specifically, Fig. 5 shows the detailed expansion procedure of J-tree from 1 vehicle to 18 vehicles.
Algorithm 1 Finding the Insertion Node in J-Tree
1: x ← J − root; 2: while usernumber(x) = 3 k for some integer k do 3: while usernumber(leftchild(x)) = 3 k do 4: x ← leftchild(x) 5: end while 6: while usernumber(midchild(x)) < usernumber(leftchild(x)) do 7: x ← midchild(x) 8: end while 9: while usernumber(rightchild(x)) < usernumber(midchild(x)) do 10: x ← rightchild(x) 11: end while 12: insertion − node ← x 13: end while
b: VEHICLES BATCH MOVEMENT FROM J-TREE TO M-TREE
Assume that there are N 2 vehicles in J-tree. As the vehicles join the J-tree, if N 2 exceeds a threshold value, all of the vehicles in the J-tree will be moved into the M-tree in batch. If we consider the J-tree as a logical user and insert the logical user into the shortest branch leaf node of M-tree, the subgroup keys in the J-tree will remain unchanged. Thus, only the keys on the path from the shortest branch leaf node to the root node of M-tree will be recomputed. However, since M-tree becomes a skewed tree, if a vehicle leaves from the longest branch, much more time will be spent in updating the keys on this branch.
Therefore, we choose more insertion nodes in M-tree to maintain the balance of the M-tree (as shown in Fig. 6 ). Accordingly, the insertion nodes are chosen according to Algorithm 2. Then, the keys on the paths from each insertion node to the root node are computed in parallel. if w has 2 child nodes{w is a node.} then 5: w is chosen as an insertion node 6: insert one vehicle node to w if i = x − 1 then 10: if node w has no child nodes then 11: w is also chosen as an insertion node, 12: insert one vehicle node to w 13: i=i+1 14: end if 15: end if 16: if i < x then 17: if node w has no child nodes then 18: w is also chosen as a insertion node 19: insert 2 vehicle nodes to w 20: i=i+2 21: end if 22: end if 23: else 24: return 25: end if 26 : end for 27: Recompute the keys on the paths from insertions nodes to the root in parallel.
2) J-TREE PARAMETERS ANALYSIS
As we have mentioned above, when J-tree reaches its capacity, vehicles in the J-tree will be moved into the M-tree. Besides, if there are only a few nodes in M-tree, the J-tree is not activated (The detailed analysis is given in Page 7 and Page 8). Both the capacity of J-tree and J-tree activation condition will be analyzed in this section. Accordingly, the notations used in this section are listed in Table 1 .
a: J-TREE CAPACITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will discuss how to adjust the J-tree capacity to minimize average vehicle join cost T J . In the proposed TJET, the join time is measured by round. When U is moved to J-tree, let the time cost (measured as round) be t 1 . When U is moved to M-tree, let the time cost (measured by round) be t 2 . Then, the join time of U is t 1 + t 2 . Let R(i) represent the number of rounds spent by i-th car in joining the platoon. For n vehicles, they need R(1) + . . . + R(n) rounds to join the J-tree and log 3 N 1 rounds to be moved to M-tree in batch. Therefore, we have Table 2 . According to Table 2 , we can conclude that about sequence R(i), the following property holds
Here p is a nonnegative integer and q is a positive integer.
Theorem 1: Assume p is a nonnegative integer. When n = 3 p , the following equation holds
Proof of Theorem 1: See Appendix A. When n = 3 p , according to Theorem 1, we will obtain
Let p be a non-negative integer. We consider that x vehicles (3 p ≤ x < 3 p+1 ) are added into the J-tree one by one. We compute the average join time starting from the J-tree is empty. If the size of J-tree is up to the threshold value, all the users are concurrently moved into the M-tree with log 3 N 1 rounds, where log 3 N 1 is the height of M-tree, and N 1 is the number of vehicles (leaf nodes) in M-tree. Here the height of the tree is relaxed to a continuous value to simplify the analysis. If the batch movement time is considered, the join time for the x vehicles is x i=1 r i + log 3 N 1 . Then, for x vehicles, the average join cost is
According to Theorem 2, we can obtain 
= 0. Therefore, we get the optimal J-tree capacity
Moreover, we could obtain f (L J ) = holds. We conclude that each vehicle only requires at most O(log 3 log 3 n) rounds to join the J-tree and to be moved into the M-tree, where n is the size of the group. As soon as the vehicles are added into the J-tree, they can communicate with other group members, so their waiting time W J does not include the batch relocation time. Since x = 3 2 ln N 1 , the inequality W J < 2 3 log 3 (log 3 N 1 ) − 2 3 log 3 (log 3 e) + 7 ln 3 − 2 ln 2 3 ln 3 is satisfied. Therefore, their waiting cost is at most O(log 3 log 3 n) rounds.
b: J-TREE ACTIVATION CONDITION ANALYSIS
As we have aforementioned, the J-tree will not be activated unless the number of vehicles in the group exceeds a threshold value. The threshold value is considered as J-tree activation condition. We will show that the J-tree activation condition is 5.
Assume that the capacity of J-tree is L J . For L J users, they are parallelly moved into the M-tree with log 3 N 1 rounds. Besides, each user spends at most log 3 L J rounds in joining the J-tree. Therefore, for the average join time T J of L J users, the following inequality holds:
If there are only a few leaf nodes in the M-tree, the J-tree is not activated. Specifically, the J-tree will not be activated unless the inequality log 3 
is a decreasing function. We find that when N 1 > 5, f (N 1 ) ≤ 0. Therefore, when the number of vehicles in the group exceeds 5, the J-tree is activated.
E. TERNARY E-TREE ALGORITHM
We construct the ternary E-tree algorithm which includes two parts: vehicle leaving group and E-tree parameters analysis.
1) VEHICLE LEAVING GROUP
Vehicle leaving group includes two procedures: the vehicle nodes are batch relocated from M-tree to E-tree and a vehicle leaves from E-tree. The notations used in the following section are listed in Table 1 .
a: BATCH RELOCATION INTO E-TREE
The batch relocation will be performed when the batch relocation condition holds. According to [12] , the batch relocation condition is set as N c ≤ βN p . When N c ≤ βN p is satisfied, the batch relocation is executed. The insertion algorithm for E-tree is similar to the insertion algorithm for M-tree, i.e., Algorithm 2, except that x and i denote the number of nodes which will be relocated in batch to E-tree, and the number of the nodes which have been inserted into E-tree.
b: VEHICLE LEAVING FROM E-TREE
After vehicles are moved into E-tree, they will leave from Etree but not M-tree. A vehicle U c leaves E-tree by executing the following algorithm:
Algorithm 3 Vehicle Leaving Algorithm 1: if U c 's parent node has 2 child nodes then 2: delete the vehicle node U c , 3: replace U c 's parent node by U c 's sibling node. 4: end if 5: if U c 's parent node has 3 child nodes then 6: delete the vehicle node U c . 7: end if 8: Recompute all the keys which are on the path from U c 's parent node to the root node.
2) E-TREE PARAMETERS ANALYSIS
As the vehicles in M-tree are moved into E-tree, the number of vehicles in E-tree increases. In this section, we will discuss the capacity of E-tree in this section. Besides, if the M-tree is small, the E-tree is not activated. Therefore, the E-tree activation condition will also be discussed in this section.
a: E-TREE CAPACITY ANALYSIS
Assume that the first D vehicles who most likely leave the group are moved into E-tree when E-tree is empty. After that, D vehicles are moved into E-tree in batch every time, similar to those in [12] . Then, after nth batch movement, the number of vehicles in E-tree will be D+D·β +D·β 2
Therefore, when the residual rate is β ∈ [0, 1), the capacity of E-tree is
For D nodes, batch relocation needs at most 1+log 3 N 1 rounds. Note that log 3 N 1 is the average height of the M-tree. The addition of one refers to the additional one level above the M-tree and E-tree (as shown in Fig.4 (b) ). Suppose that the E-tree capacity is x, then every vehicle leaving from the E-tree will requires at most 1 + log 3 x rounds. When U is moved to E-tree, let the time cost (measured as round) be t 1 . When U leaves E-tree, let the time cost (measured by round) be t 2 . Then, the departure time of U is t 1 + t 2 . Therefore, for the average departure time T E of D vehicles the inequality log 3 x) holds, or equivalently,
To minimize the right side of (4), we have
Therefore, the capacity of E-tree is ln N 1 +ln 3 1−β . When x = ln N 1 +ln 3 1−β , the average exit time is T E ≤ log 3 (log 3 N 1 )−log 3 log 3 e−log 3 (1−β) + 1 + log 3 e
We can see the average exit time is bounded by O(log 3 log 3 n) where n is the group size. According to L E = 
That is, in order to minimize T E , ln N 1 + ln 3 vehicles are moved from M-tree to E-tree in batch every time.
When β is set as 0, the batch movement will not be executed, unless the E-tree becomes empty. Otherwise, if β is close to 1, the batch relocation will be performed frequently.
b: E-TREE ACTIVATION CONDITION
If the vehicles leave the group from M-tree, the average departure time is T S = log 3 N 1 . If E-tree is explored, the average departure time is T E = 1 L E (1−β) (log 3 N 1 +1)+(log 3 L E + 1). If T E ≤ T S is satisfied, E-tree will be activated. That is, the following equation should hold:
According to x = ln N 1 +ln 3 1−β
and (5), we can obtain ln(ln
ln(y + ln 3) − y + ln 3 + 1 < 0. When y > 0, we have f (y) = 1 y+ln 3 − 1 < 0. Therefore, When y > 0, f (y) is a decreasing function. That is, when β = 0, for any N 1 > 38, the inequality (5) holds. Besides, we compute different activation conditions for different β. For instance, for β = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5, the activation conditions are 45, 52, 61, 74, and 92, respectively. According to the results of the experiment, we suggest that β is set around 0. Then, if the group size is larger than 38 and the E-tree is activated.
F. TJET IN PLATOONS
In this section, we will introduce five protocols in vehicle platooning, i.e., the platoon group key establishment, vehicle join, vehicle exit, platoon merge and platoon split protocols.
1) PLATOON KEY ESTABLISHMENT
If multiple vehicles want to form a platoon, the corresponding ternary key tree will be constructed and the subgroup keys will be parallelly computed in bottom-up pattern. The details about building a ternary key tree and computing the group key have been introduced in Section IV-A. After the platoon P is established, when a single vehicle wishes to join P, the key update will be realized by executing the vehicle join protocol which will be described in next section.
2) VEHICLE JOIN
Let N denote the number of vehicles in the platoon, N 1 and N 2 represent the numbers of nodes in M-tree and J-tree, respectively. Assume that the vehicle V wants to join the platoon.
• If N = 1 or 2, V executes a 2-or 3-party DH protocol with the platoon members.
• When N = 3 or 4, V executes a 2-party DH protocol.
• If N ≥ 5, J-tree is activated. The new user insert into J-tree procedure (as shown in IV-D.1) will be executed.
• As N 2 increases, if J-tree is full, execute Algorithm 2.
• Update the capacity of J-tree. VOLUME 5, 2017
3) VEHICLE EXIT
If N 1 > 38 and β = 0, the equation 5 is satisfied. Thus, the E-tree is activated. When a vehicle leaves from the group, Algorithm 3 is performed. If E-tree batch relocation threshold is achieved, Algorithm 2 is executed. With the increase/decrease of the users in M-tree, the capacity of E-tree will be recomputed.
4) PLATOON MERGE
When multiple platoons want to merge into one big platoon, the group key for the big platoon needs to be established. We consider each small platoon as a logic user, construct a ternary key tree for the logic users, and then compute the session key for the logic users. The details to construct the key tree and compute the group key have been showed in Section IV-A. Assume that Platoon P 1 consists of vehicles V 1 , V 2 and V 3 ; P 2 consists of vehicles V 4 , V 5 and V 6 ; P 3 consists of vehicles V 7 and V 8 ; As Fig. 7 (a) shows, platoons P 1 , P 2 and P 3 will merge into a new platoon. Let a i represent the private key of V i . Then, the session keys for platoon P 1 , P 2 and P 3 are , g) a 4 a 5 a 6 ), and K 3 = H (g a 7 a 8 ), respectively. To establish a new group key, the messages g K 1 , g K 2 , and g K 3 will be sent among P 1 , P 2 and P 3 . Finally, the new group key H (ê(g, g) K 1 K 2 K 3 ) is computed by all the vehicles in the platoon.
When two or more platoons merge into one platoon, all the nodes of the platoons form a main tree. According to the size of the main tree, the capacities of exit tree and join tree are computed, respectively. Then, new nodes join in join tree and nodes leave from exit tree.
5) PLATOON SPLIT
When a platoon want to split in several small platoons, a new group key needs to be established inside each small platoon for further communication. Assume that the platoon P will split in platoons P 1 ,. . . , P n . In a ternary key tree, each inner node bounds a key which is shared by all members of the subtrees rooted at the inner node. Thus, all these member nodes of the subtree form a subgroup.
• If such a subgroup forms a small platoon P i (as shown in Fig. 7 (b) Platoon P 1 ), then it is not necessary to generate a new group key for P i .
• If a platoon P i consists of several subgroups (as shown in Fig. 7 (b) Platoon P 2 ), then each subgroup will be considered as a logic user. A ternary key tree will be constructed for these logic users to compute the shared session key.
• If there is no subgroup in P i (as shown in Fig. 7 (b) Platoon P 4 ), each vehicle in P i is considered as a node.
A ternary tree will be built for the nodes and then the group key is computed.
• If P i consists of subgroups and single vehicles (as shown in Fig. 7 (b) Platoon P 3 ), the subgroup will be considered as a logic user. A ternary tree will be constructed for the logic users and vehicle nodes.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the security properties of the proposed TJET scheme. Particularly, according to the security requirements discussed earlier, our analysis will focus on how the proposed TJET scheme can capture the group key's forward security and backward security, authentication, integrity and resist key control. Since only active outside adversary is considered in our scheme, other attacks launched by the inside adversary, e.g., the collusion among joined vehicles and departed vehicles are out of the scope of this paper.
• Authentication. The TJET holds authentication. Thus, the attackers cannot impersonate the vehicles to execute the TJET scheme.
• Integrity. The TJET holds data integrity which ensures that data sent by vehicles has not been altered by attackers.
• Forward security. The proposed TJET scheme holds forward security. That is, as soon as a vehicle member V leaves the platoon, V cannot communicate with the vehicle members any more. Specifically, after a vehicle member V leaves a platoon, the platoon members will update the group key.
• Backward security. The proposed TJET scheme holds backward secrecy. In other words, after a vehicle member V joins a platoon, it cannot compute any previous platoon group key. That is, the new member cannot get earlier information inside the platoon. Before V joins the platoon, it did not participate the execution of the TJET scheme. Specifically, none of the messages used to compute the session key is generated by V.
• Resistance to key control. For proposed TJET scheme, any vehicle in a platoon cannot choose or influence the value of the platoon group key. The reason is the group key is computed by the random numbers generated by each vehicle in the platoon. Thus, the proposed TJET scheme can resist key control.
A. PARTICIPANTS AND NOTATIONS
We 
B. ADVERSARIAL MODEL
We define security by using a game run between a challenger C playing n participants, and an adversary A. We want to prove that A cannot distinguish a common group session key of any fresh instance (see Definition 3) from a random string. In our model, after A has received the challenge, he can continue starting and revealing instances except of the tested instance or any instance which is partnered with it.
C responds to A's queries as follows:
• Send( s i , ): Send messages to instance s i , and the answer generated by this instance.
• k.Reveal( s i ): Return the common group key and subgroup keys.
• Currupt(U i ): Return the private key of U i . (This query is used to show that even all the private keys are leaked, the previous keys will not be computed.)
This query is allowed to issued only once. A submits the query, C picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly, then returns k b to A. It is required that π 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we will compare the time efficiency of our TJET scheme and JET scheme proposed in [12] . The notations used in this section are listed in Table 1 .
A. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The time efficiency is measured by the numbers of rounds required to execute the DH protocol. In each round, a user executes one 2-party/3-party DH operation. In order to facilitate the comparison and analysis, we take the same definitions of average join/exit cost presented in [12] . Specifically, the average join cost T J is represented by
, the average exit cost T E is represented by T E =
R E N E
, and the average processing cost is T =
Assume that there have been n vehicles in the platoon. In Table 3 , we compare the average user join cost of proposed TJET scheme and JET scheme. In proposed TJET scheme, when n ≤ 5, the new user will be added into the M-tree. Therefore, the average join cost is O(log 3 (n)) rounds. When n > 5, the J-tree is activated, the average join cost is reduced to O(log 3 (log 3 (n))) rounds. Comparatively, the join tree activation condition of JET is n > 8. When n ≤ 8, in JET scheme the average join cost is O(log 2 (n)) rounds. When n > 8, the average join cost is O(log 2 (log 2 (n))) rounds. Table 4 shows the average user exit cost of proposed TJET scheme and JET scheme. We can see in JET when 38 < n ≤ 256, the average user exit cost is O(log 2 (n)) rounds. In the proposed TJET, the average user exit cost has been reduced to O(log 3 (log 3 (n))) rounds. Fig. 8 (a) shows the average join cost T J for the proposed TJET scheme varying with N J from 0 to 300 when the VOLUME 5, 2017 E-tree activation is 38 (β = 0) and 92 (β = 0.5) and the initial platoon size is 0. In order to indicate the variations of T J with N J , we let the vehicles stay enough time in the platoon, which means no vehicles leave the platoon during this period. Fig. 8 (b) shows the average exit cost T E for the proposed TJET scheme varying with N E from 1 to 300 and the initial platoon size is 0. In order to indicate the change of T E over N E , we suppose 1) no vehicles join the platoon during this period; 2) the vehicles follow the principle of first-infirst-out (FIFO). In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , we compare the average join/exit /join & exit cost with all join events and exit events occurs in the whole simulation. The initial platoon size is 0. Let each time unit contains 10 minutes, the duration of simulation is 48 time units. In the simulations, vehicles' arrival time is modeled as a Poisson process with mean arrival rate λ i , and vehicles' staying time follows an exponential distribution with mean value m i . Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 show the average join/exit cost varies with the average arrival rate as 2 cars per time unit, 4 cars per time unit, . . . , 30 cars per time unit. In Fig. 9 (a) and Fig. 10 (a) , the average time per vehicle staying in the platoon is 2 hours. In Fig. 9 (b) and Fig. 10  (b) , the average time per vehicle staying in the platoon for is 4 hours. Additionally, in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , β is set as 0.5 for JET scheme, since Mao et al. [12] suggested that setting β to around 0.5 for JET. In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , β is set as 0 and 0.5 for TJET, respectively.
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 1) EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS

2) EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In Fig. 8 (a) , we can see as N J goes up from 1 to 300, T J has an whole upward trend. However, in some points, T J declines. The reason is when the J-tree is empty, the new node join cost is only 1, which makes T J decreases. In contrast, if a new node is added and the J-tree is full, all the nodes in the J-tree are moved into the M-tree, the new node join cost will be log 3 N 1 + log 3 N 2 , which makes T J grows dramatically.
In Fig. 8 (a) , as N J rises, T J grows slowly. That is because both the levels of M-tree and J-tree increase more slowly than the number of vehicles. Moreover, the slow growth of join cost is burdened by more vehicles. Therefore, T J increases slowly with N J increasing. In addition, we can observe that in this case β has little effect on T J .
In Fig. 8 (b) , when β = 0 and N E ≤ 38, T E increases/declines significantly at some points. For example, when N E = 31, T E are 1.9355 rounds. In contrast, T E rises up to 2.8125 rounds when N E = 32. The reason is 1) the E-tree has not been activated, all the vehicles will leave the platoon from M-tree; 2) when there are 32 nodes in the tree, the join tree contains one node. Thus, the level of each node in M-tree increases 1, which makes T E goes up dramatically. When N E is 33, T E goes down to 2.7576 rounds. That is because 1) the level of each node in M-tree remains unchanged; 2) the new node spends less cost leaving the group than the current nodes in M-tree.
When N E > 38, the E-tree has been activated. Thus, adding a new node will not result in the level of each node in M-tree increasing. However, as N E increases, T E still declines at some points. The reason is the exit cost of these new nodes is less than the old nodes. When the exit cost of new nodes is more than that of old nodes, T E increases. Similarly, we can see when β = 0.5 (E-tree activation condition is 92) and N E ≤ 92, T E increases/declines dramatically at some points. We can conclude that in this case β should be set as 0 to achieve key updating more efficiently.
From Fig. 9 , we can observe that the average join/leave/ join & exit cost of the proposed TJET scheme remains less than that of JET for any arrival rate, and any staying time. Generally speaking, the smaller staying time results in fewer vehicles in the platoon and smaller sizes of M-tree, J-tree and E-tree. However, though the vehicles stay longer in Fig. 9 (b) than that of Fig. 9 (a) , the average join cost of the proposed TJET increases little. That is because in the proposed TJET, even though the number of vehicles increases a lot, the size of J-tree and M-tree only increase a little. For instance, when N 1 increases from 100 to 400, the capacity of J-tree increases from 3 2 ln(100) ≈ 6.9 to 3 2 ln(400) ≈ 8.99. Additionally, the vehicles spend less time for key updating when new vehicles join the platoon in the proposed TJET scheme. Moreover, as the average arrival rate rises and vehicles' average staying time increases rapidly, the average join cost rises more slowly for TJET, since comparing with JET the key updating cost of TJET is O(log 3 (log 3 (n))) rounds.
In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , the overall appearance of the average leave cost is that: as the average arrival rate grows, the average exit cost increases. It is because the size of the tree grows as the average arrival rate grows. However, in some point, when the arrival rate rises, T E declines in TJET. The reason is that as the arrival rate rises, the number of vehicles increases. After the number of vehicles rises up to the E-tree activation condition, the E-tree is activated. Besides, after the E-tree is activated, the exit cost of some new nodes may be less than that of old nodes. Therefore, T E decreases at some points. From Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , we can see that the vehicles spend less time updating the group key for user joining or leaving in TJET than that of JET both for β = 0 and β = 0.5.
VII. RELATED WORKS
The related work about key management for vehicular platooning is not introduced in this section, since there is no dynamic key management scheme for platoon proposed before. In this section, we will mainly explore some of the existing platoon management protocols and tree-based key management schemes.
In [24] , the authors considered how to merge two platoons into one big platoon. They defined the data shared among the platoon members and described how to utilize the data to realize the merger operation. In [25] , the authors introduced the design of an on-board supervisor to achieve new user joining, vehicle exit with an automated lane change, and making a platoon stop at the end of a highway. Hall et al. [26] considered the platoon as a multi-agent system to capture inter-vehicle coordination. They assigned roles to the vehicles. For instance, the vehicle which will exit is named as splitter, the vehicle behind it is gap creator and other vehicles which monitor the situation are safety observers. Jia et al. [1] proposed a novel disturbance-adaptive platoon architecture. They discussed the traffic dynamics inside the platoons in disturbance scenario and optimize the distance between two platoon members and the platoon size. In order to distinguish the messages sent by the vehicles from different platoons, platoon-ID should be allocated. Filtermulticast [27] is proposed to realize distributing dynamic platoon-ID. Segata et al. [28] proposed a vehicle-platoon protocol to identify the platoon formation and predict platoon splits. A data management component is also designed to inform the platoon members to replicate the data, since a vehicle contributes parts of their buffers to other platoon members and shared data with them. To maximize the platoon size and the life time of a platoon, Hall et al. [29] proposed a platoon management strategy. Dao et al. [30] proposed a distribute-control strategy, by which cars could be sorted to appropriate platoons and lanes, and the balance of lane traffic flows and decreasing the vehicle travel time could be achieved. Though numerous work have been undertaken for platoon management, they never take the secure communication inside the platoon into consideration yet do they consider the necessity of secure key establishment for platoons.
There have been some simple and efficient key management schemes proposed for group communication.
Kim et al. [31] proposed a secure and efficient key management protocol based on binary tree. In their scheme, the leaf nodes host members and every parent of two nodes blinds a key. In Kim et al.'s scheme, the computation cost is O(log 2 (n)) and DH key agreement is explored to compute and update the group key. In order to improve the time efficiency of key update, Lee et al. [10] proposed a novel tree based group key agreement based on ternary tree using bilinear map. They reduced the computation cost to O(log 3 (n)). Dutta and Barua [11] proposed an authenticated dynamic group key agreement scheme in tree setting based on [32] and [33] . In [11] , O(log 3 (n)) key updates are required in the execution of user insertion and deletion. Mao et al. [12] presented a join-exit-tree based key management scheme. In their scheme, the computation cost of key update is reduced to O(log 2 (log 2 (n)). Besides, some other excellent constant-round key agreement protocols are proposed, e.g., the schemes in [25] and [36] only require one round to establish a group key. However, the protocol is not constructed for dynamic groups. That is, all the group members have to reexecute the whole protocol for any join/exit event.
Nam et al. [35] proposed a key management protocol. However, Tseng [36] pointed out that Nam et al.'s protocol was a key distribution scheme, but not a real key agreement protocol. In a key distribution scheme, a secret key between the key distribution centre and user needs to be established before the key distribution scheme is executed. Though Tseng [37] proposed a more efficient key agreement protocol. However, it is static, and not suitable in mobile networks. In [38] , Dutta and Barua presented a group key agreement protocol (called Dutta-Barua protocol) in dynamic setting with which users can efficiently join or leave a group. Then, they proposed a formal security model and provided security proofs in [39] to evidence the security of Dutta-Barua protocol. Teo et al. [40] showed that the protocol in [38] fails to achieve backward secrecy. Besides, Tan and Yang [41] showed that the Dutta-Barua protocol is insecure against an outsider adversary defined by the adversarial model in [39] . Junbeom Hur and Younho Lee [42] proposed a key management scheme. However, it is still a distribution scheme. When a member joins or leaves the group, secret group keys are updated and delivered to the valid group members using the key update protocol. Teng and Wu [43] proposed a key agreement protocol for low-power mobile devices. In their protocol, a powerful node (also called server) will generate the messages and send them to all the users to establish the group key. In addition, authenticated private channel between the key server and the users are assumed during system setup and key distribution for a newly joining member. Seo et al. [44] has established a certificateless effective key management scheme in dynamic wireless sensor networks. In their scheme, only the cluster head can update the cluster key when a node leaves or joins the cluster, after updating the group key, the cluster head will send the key to the cluster members. Tang et al. [45] presented a novel group key management designed with a group controller (GC). In their approach, a hyper-sphere is constructed for a group and each member in the group corresponds to the member's private point on the hyper-sphere. The GC computes the central point of the hyper-sphere, and publishes it such that each member can compute a common group key, using a function by taking members' private points and the central point of the hyper-sphere as the input. Thus, the members cannot establish a common group key without GC. Büttner et al. [46] has proposed an anonymous authenticated key agreement protocol for vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks. In their scheme, the key security and privacy preservation of the vehicles are achieved. However, only two participants are involved in their scheme. Yang et al. [47] proposed an efficient group key agreement scheme for mobile Ad-Hoc Networks based on Identity Based Broadcast Encryption methodology to enable secure group communications. Their scheme only requires constant rounds. When a new Ad-hoc network is constructed, the suggested scheme requires no message exchange to establish a group key if the receivers' identities are known to the broadcaster. However, the session key is not computed by the group members together, but generated by broadcaster. That is, their scheme cannot resist key control. Shanthi and Murugan [48] proposed hop by hop group key agreement protocol where each node generates pairwise key for encryption of data. After that, group key agreement protocol is executed to provide complete authentication for those nodes. However, the user join and exit is not considered in this paper.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed an efficient key management scheme (TJET) which achieves dynamic group key update for vehicle platooning. To realize TJET, we have designed ternary join-exit-tree based dynamic join and leave algorithms. TJET's efficacy has been evaluated with theoretical analysis and experiments, and detailed analysis shows it holds forward security, backward security and can resist key control. Compared with JET scheme, the proposed TJET scheme has been identified to significantly reduce the cost of group key updating for the vehicle joining and leaving by strict mathematical proof. In addition, through extensive performance evaluations, we have further demonstrated that the proposed TJET scheme can achieve much better efficiency in terms of the average join time and average leave time during key update procedure.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: This theorem is proven with mathematical induction. As Table 2 shows, when p = 0, 1, 2 the equation (2) holds. Assume that the equation (2) holds for n = 3 p , i.e.,
According to the equation (1), we have
That is, when n = 3 p+1 , n i=1 R(i) = n( 2 3 log 3 n + 1) holds.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: This theorem is also proven with mathematical induction. When n = 3 and n = 9, according to Table 2 the inequality
holds. Assume for n = 3 p and 1 ≤ k < n, the inequality
is satisfied. When n = 3 p , assume that r 1 = q 1 , r 2 = q 2 , . . . , r n = q n , then according to equation (1), we have r n+1 = 1 + q 1 , r n+2 = 1 + q 2 , . . . , r 2n = 1 + q n , and r 2n+1 = 1 + q 1 , r 2n+2 = 1 + q 2 , . . . , r 3n = 1 + q n . Let a n = n i=1 r i n . When n = 3 p+1 , for 3 p ≤ k < 3 p+1 , we obtain k i=1 r i = r 1 + r 2 + · · · + r k = q 1 + q 2 + . . . + q n/3 + q n/3+1 + q n/3+2 + . . . + q k = a n/3 · n 3 + q n/3+1 + q n/3+2 + . . . + q k < a n/3 · n 3 + (k − n 3 )(a n/3 + 1)
= ka n/3 + k − n 3 and k i=1 r i k = a n/3 + 1 − n 3k . Since k < n, we have a n/3 + 1 − n 3k < a n/3 + . Therefore, when n = 3 p+1 , for
n . Thus, when p is a non-negative integer, for n = 3 p , and 1 ≤ k < n, k i=1 r i k < n i=1 r i n holds.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: Let C be a challenger. Suppose C receives an instance of the DHBDH problem, i.e., given g, g α , g β , g γ , H (ê(g, g) αβγ ) and T to distinguish H (ê(g, g) αβγ ) and T , and an instance of the HDH problem, i.e., given (g, g α , g β ), H (g αβ ) and T to distinguish H (g αβ ) and T .
Let A be the adversary who wants to break the protocol. We will show how to break DHBDH assumption or HDH assumption by using A. C passes the system parameters to A. H is treated as a random oracle.
Assume that the adversary executes q e Send queries. 
